



Teddy Brett: Failed Markets, Failed States and the Global Recession:
Responding to the Financial Crisis
“…  the  world  economy  has  rarely  been  in  better  shape  than  it  is  today.  [We
have] yet again revised upwards expectations for global growth . . . growth in the
United States  remains  rapid  .  .  .  there are signs of an upturn  in  those parts of
Western Europe … where  growth  has  been  sluggish   … The  global  economy
appears  to  be  more  resilient  …  than  it  was  even  a  short  time  ago.”  (Anne
Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF 2006) 
“Recent  developments  have  broadly  confirmed  [our]  prognosis  [that]  the  current  economic
situation is in many ways better than what we have experienced in years . . . Our central forecast
remains  quite  benign  .  .  .  [we  expect  the  OECD  to  show]  strong  job  creation  and  falling
unemployment.” (Jean­Philippe Cotis,  Chief Economist OECD May 2007)
“The consensus  forecast  for  the global economy … anticipates  that  recent high  levels of growth
will  continue,  that  global  inflation  will  stay  quite  subdued,  and  that  global  current  account
imbalances  will  gradually  moderate.  …  Evidently,  and  appropriately  [it]  implicitly  assumes  that
there  will  be  no  major  geopolitical  disruptions  and  no  disturbances  in  the  financial  sector
significant enough to affect the real economy.” (Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report,
2006­7: 140)
The Logic of Deregulated Markets
Continuous  financial deregulation since  the 1970s has been  justified by Alan Greenspan’s claim
that
“Unfettered markets [must] create a degree of wealth that fosters a more civilized
existence’,  because  market  capitalism  based  on  the  principle  of  creative
destruction,’ would replace ‘less­productive capital … with innovative cutting­edge





competition must produce self­adjusting mechanisms  that enable  losers  to  find more productive
jobs  in  new  firms,  and  punish  inefficient  or  irresponsible  ones  without  generating  systemic
problems. This was also expected  to apply  in  the  financial sector where  large diversified banks,
globalised  markets  and  new  instruments  for  sharing,  hedging  and  insuring  against  risk  were
expected to prevent systemic failures. Deregulation after the 1970s produced massive increases
in  lending, and profits and bonuses for banks and bankers that seemed to validate these claims
despite  the  financial  crises  in  the  1980s  and  1990s,  encouraging  widespread  optimism    in  the
orthodox policy community expressed in the quotations at the head of this paper.
Deregulated Markets, Financial Sector Instability and Global Crises








eliminated  financial  and  banking  crises  between  the  1930s  and  1970s,  but  deregulation  has
produced chronic instability and generalised economic crises:
Liberalization in the 1920s produced multiple bank failures in the early 1930s, partly driven by the
collapse of the over-leveraged stock and property market in the USA and a run on the banks.
The Eurocurrency market in the 1970s allowed banks to evade national regulations and take on risky
levels of public debt that produced the sovereign debt crisis in 1981/2 when raw material prices fell and
interest rates increased.
Over-borrowing, bad governance and falling raw material prices produced the African Debt Crisis in the
early 1990s linked to liberal structural Adjustment Programmes.
Opportunism; malfeasance; rigidities; and herd behaviour produced the East Asian financial crisis in
1997.
Unregulated lending, magnified by securitisation and hedging produced unsustainable property bubbles
and sovereign debt problems that bankrupted major banks in 2007-8.




stability  of  the  whole  system,  and  where  competition  generates  investment  opportunities  for
weaker as well as stronger producers and states. These assumptions are especially problematic
in the financial sector for three reasons:
bounded rationality, opportunism and malfeasance;
scale economies and systemic risk;
and the destabilizing and deflationary consequences of uneven development and sovereign risk.
Bounded Rationality, Opportunism & Malfeasance  (Williamson, 1985)
Banks borrow short and lend long, and thus depend on reliable information about future prices and
the  stability  and  honesty  of  the  individuals,  firms  or  states  to  which  they  lend.  However,
unforeseen changes  lead  to maturity  transformation problems, crises of confidence and runs on
banks.  Intense competition and perverse  incentives generated by over­leveraged  loan positions
based  on  new  financial  instruments  like  sub­prime  mortgages,  derivatives  and  hedge­funds
increase  rather  than  spread  risk  by  concealing  information  and  increase  opportunism  and
malfeasance.
Centralisation, Concentration and Systemic Risk
Scale economies concentrated resources in a few banks that provide public goods by protecting
savings  and  supplying  credit.  This  does  not  protect  them  from  competitive  pressures,  but  does
make them too big and too indispensable to fail, thus protecting them from market discipline. Inter­
bank  lending, amplified by  the expansion of new  financial  instruments, concentrate and conceal
rather than dispersing risk, so the failure of any significant bank threatens the system as a whole.
Uneven Development, Exclusion, and Weak Investment Opportunities 
(Marx/Schumpeter)
Firm  and  regional  level  scale  economies  produce  the  ‘creative  destruction’  that  did  not  just
produce  ‘distress’,    but  increased  global  inequality,  destroyed  weak  firms  and  jobs,  and
marginalised weak states, as well as creating bad loans and financial  and economic crises. They
also constrained investment opportunities in productive enterprises, and fueled investment in non­
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Conclusion
Thus  the  consequence  of  unmanaged  creative  destruction  has  not  been  a  limited  amount  of
‘distress’  and  ‘social  costs’,  but  regular  systemic  crises  that  have  threatened  the  viability  of  the
economic system, and indeed, of civilized life itself, and led to demands from the corporate sector
itself  rather  than  the  left  for  the  state  to  rescue  the  financial  sector  from  the  destructive
consequences of unregulated markets, as Polanyi argued.
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